Inset of Sheet 8 of the atlas

HALLMARK_ · damage-analysis.com

What our machine read from outside about where damage-analysis.com is served from, signed, with a date after which it stops counting.

damage-analysis.com is a site that DAREAKT serves. This hallmark is a signed reading of only what DAREAKT controls for that host: the name resolves to our server, our nginx answers on it over TLS 1.3, and it serves our security.txt. Our machine reads those three things from outside, at a stated time, and signs what it read.

It is a reading. It is not a certification, an audit or a warranty of the site, and it says nothing about the site's business, its content or how it handles data. It says what was true as read at the time shown, not what is true now, and anyone can repeat each check.

The verdict

Decided in your browser, never printed by us.

HALLMARK_SERVED FROM DAREAKTH-······························ → ··········

Nothing on this page has been checked until its script has run. The result is worked out in your browser, never printed by us. The files are public, and the ways to check them yourself are further down.

Add ?s=H-000001 to the address to read a particular serial. Without it, the newest hallmark in the register of damage-analysis.com is shown.

Serial
Subject
Release
Issued
Not after
Scope

What it covers

Three readings of what DAREAKT controls for damage-analysis.com, and the line you can run to repeat each.

  • served-from

    damage-analysis.com resolves to the DAREAKT server by plain DNS lookup, which is not DNSSEC-validated.

    Run dig A and dig AAAA on damage-analysis.com and compare each address with the list in the evidence note.
  • tls13

    damage-analysis.com accepts encrypted connections over TLS 1.3.

    Run openssl s_client -connect damage-analysis.com:443 -tls1_3 and look for a completed handshake.
  • security-txt

    damage-analysis.com publishes a security.txt saying how to report a vulnerability, with a future expiry date.

    Open damage-analysis.com/.well-known/security.txt and read the Contact and Expires lines.

What a hallmark never covers

Not a certification, an audit or a warranty. And the six states this page can show.

  • The site's business: what it does, who runs it, whether it is any good.
  • The site's content: what its pages say, and whether it is true.
  • How the site handles data: what it collects, stores or shares, and with whom.
  • The security of the site's own code, accounts or database. Only the three readings under What it covers are made.
  • Claims read from inside, and promises: a stranger cannot repeat them.
  • What is true now: a hallmark says what was read at the time shown.
  • Anything not listed under What it covers. A hallmark vouches only for its own list.

Check it yourself

Three ways, from weakest to strongest.

  1. ON THIS PAGE_

    The quickest way, and the weakest

    • Your browser checks the Ed25519 signature of the hallmark, of every register entry and of the head, against the key fingerprint this page carries.

    It shows the file is whole and signed by the key it names. It cannot show the key is ours, because the page and the key come from the same place.

  2. IN DNS_

    A second place for the key

    • The key's fingerprint is also published in our DNS, at _hallmark.dareakt.com. Every hallmark we sign, for any site, is pinned there.
    • One command with delv, on your own machine, reads it and says whether the answer was validated.

    The command dig does not check the signatures in DNS, so use delv.

  3. ON YOUR MACHINE_

    The strongest: nothing comes from this page

    • Five steps with curl, python3 and openssl 3 check a signature without trusting anything here.
    • Then repeat any check under What it covers with the command beneath it.

    If your own reading differs from ours, the hallmark is wrong.

The signed files

One file per hallmark, one register, one head, kept for damage-analysis.com on dareakt.com. Every file is signed with an Ed25519 key over its payload text, byte for byte. The register is a hash chain, and the head records how long it was when it was signed, so a register cut short can be seen. The same files are also served on damage-analysis.com itself, at /.well-known/hallmark/.

  1. A hallmark

    https://dareakt.com/.well-known/hallmark/damage-analysis/H-NNNNNN.json
  2. The claims record it points at, kept byte for byte

    https://dareakt.com/.well-known/hallmark/damage-analysis/H-NNNNNN.claims.json
  3. The register of every hallmark and every revoke

    https://dareakt.com/.well-known/hallmark/damage-analysis/register.json
  4. The signed head of the register

    https://dareakt.com/.well-known/hallmark/damage-analysis/head.json
  5. The public key

    https://dareakt.com/keys/hallmark-ed25519-public.pem

Check the key in DNS

This page cannot prove the key is ours, because the page and the key come from the same place. The DNS record is the second place.

  1. Read the key's record with delv

    delv @185.12.64.2 _hallmark.dareakt.com TXT

The answer must say "; fully validated", and a TXT line must carry spki-sha256= followed by the fingerprint below. If the answer is not validated, or the fingerprint differs, or there is no such record, do not trust the hallmark.

Verify it with OpenSSL

Five steps on any machine with curl, python3 and openssl 3. Replace the serial with the one you want to check; this page has filled in the one it read.

  1. 1. Fetch a hallmark and the key

    curl -sO https://dareakt.com/.well-known/hallmark/damage-analysis/H-NNNNNN.json -O https://dareakt.com/keys/hallmark-ed25519-public.pem
  2. 2. Hash the key and compare it with the SPKI SHA-256 below

    openssl pkey -pubin -in hallmark-ed25519-public.pem -outform DER | openssl dgst -sha256
  3. 3. Compare it with the hash in DNS, using the delv command above.

  4. 4. Split the file into the signed text and the signature

    python3 -c 'import json,base64;d=json.load(open("H-NNNNNN.json",encoding="utf-8"));open("payload.txt","w",encoding="utf-8",newline="").write(d["payload"]);open("sig.bin","wb").write(base64.b64decode(d["signature"]["sig"]))'
  5. 5. Verify the signature

    openssl pkeyutl -verify -pubin -inkey hallmark-ed25519-public.pem -rawin -in payload.txt -sigfile sig.bin

A good file prints Signature Verified Successfully. The signed text is the payload field byte for byte, so do not reformat it.

Pinned key (hallmark-v1)SPKI SHA-256 88559d78b028ddaa6db16a8cad6e1fb1054f93c67438b72367332c8588c6d97b

Signing key
Register head signed
Checked by this page
Claims record
Scope hash
Prior serial
Previous hash

Every check inside a hallmark is a reading our machine made from outside, and its method is written beside it. If your own reading differs from ours, the hallmark is wrong.